State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from October 15, 2013 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
10-15-2013 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from October 15, 2013 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from October 
15, 2013 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/652 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6200
TOWN OF ISLIP,
Employer,
-and-
)
CITY EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
Intervenor.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their
Certification - C-6200 - 2 -
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.
Included: All regular full-time white collar workers as set forth in the attached
Schedule A.
Excluded: Elected or appointed officials, department heads, deputies,
designated confidential employees, part-time employees, seasonal 
employees and temporary employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: October 15, 2013 
Brooklyn, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
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TITLE
Account Clerk
Account Clerk Typist
Administrative Aide
Administrative Assistant
Adult Day Care Program Supervisor
Airport Administrative Assistant
Airport Administrative Supervisor
Airport Identification Technician
Alcoholism Counselor
Alcoholism Counselor -  (Spanish Speaking)
Animal Health Technician ■
Architectural Drafter I 
Architectural Drafter 11 
Assessment Aide 
Assessment Assistant 
Assessment Clerk 
■ Assistant Architect 
Assistant to Assessor 
Assistant Civil Engineer 
Assistant Cook
Assistant Federal &  State Aid Claims Coordinator 
Assistant Federal & State Aid Coordinator 
Assistant Intergovernmental Relations Coordinator 
Assistant Recreation Leader 
Asst. Senior Citizen Center Manager 
Assistant Site Plan Reviewer 
Assistant to Town Tax Receiver 
' Assistant Waterways Management Supervisor 
Bay Management Specialist I 
Bay Management Specialist II 
Bay Management Specialist III 
Budget Assistant 
Budget Technician 
Building Inspector 
Building Permits Coordinator 
Building Plans Examiner 
Case Manager
Case Manager -  (Spanish Speaking)
Caseworker
Caseworker Trainee t 
Cashier
Chief Fire Marshall 
Clerk
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12
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11
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Clerk Typist
Clerk-Typist (Spanish Speaking)
Community Development Assistant 
Community Development Program Technician 
Community Development Specialist 
Community Relations Assistant 
Community Relations Specialist
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8 • Community Service Aide
5 Community Service Worker
11 Computer Operator I
13 Computer Operator II
15 Computer Operator III
17 Computer Programmer
16 Computer Programmer Trainee
12 Computer Technician
16 Contracts Examiner
14 Contract Technician
10 . Cook
18 Coordinator of Alcoholism Services
15 Cultural Affairs Supervisor
6 Data Entry Operator
10 Data Processing Equipment Operator
10 Drafter I
12 Drafter II
16 Drug Abuse Educator
14 Drug & Alcohol Community Coordinator I
14 Drug.& Alcohol Counselor I
14 ■ Drug & Alcohol Counselor 1 (Spanish.Speaking)
1.6 Drug & Alcohol Counselor II
14 ■ Drug & Alcohol Hotline Coordinator
17 Employees Assistance. Program Coordinator
10 Engineering Aide
11 Engineering Inspector
7 Environmental Aide
15 Environmental Analyst
7 Environmental Assistant
15 • Environmental Planner
1.0 Environmental Technician
12 Environmentalist I
16 Environmentalist II
B Fire Marshall I
15 FireMarshaIl.il
6 Food Service Worker
17 Graphics Materials Designer
• 18 Graphics Supervisor
18 Head Clerk
14 Health Financial Analyst
8 Home Health Aide
16 Hotline Coordinator
12 Flousing Inspector
13 Industrial Development Assistant
11 Legal Stenographer
11 Lighting Inspector
6 Mail Clerk
14 Map Drafter I
9 Micrographies Operator
8 Museum Restoration Specialist
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Neighborhood Aide
Network Communication Specialist
Network & Systems Coordinator
Ordinance Inspector
Paralegal Assistant
Park Interpretive Specialist
Payroll Supervisor
Photographer
Planner
Planner Trainee 
Planner-Youth Services 
Planning Aide 
Plumbing Inspector 
Principal Account Clerk 
Principal Assessment Clerk 
Principal Building Inspector 
Principal Clerk 
Principal Data Entry Operator 
Principal Engineering Aide 
Principal Housing Inspector 
Principal Planner 
Principal Stenographer 
Principal Zoning Inspector 
Real Property Appraiser II 
Recreation Aide 
Recreation Center Manager.
Recreation Leader 
Recreation Program Coordinator 
Recreation Specialist ,
Recreation Supervisor 
Sanitation Inspector
Sanitation Inspector (Spanish Speaking). 
Secretarial Assistant.
Senior Account Clerk
Senior Administrative Assistant
Senior Assessment Assistant
Senior Assessment Clerk
Senior Building Inspector
Senior Case Manager
Senior Cashier
Senior Citizen Aide
Senior Citizen Center Manager
Senior Citizen Club Leader
Senior Citizen Nutrition Center Manager
Senior Citizen Program Supervisor
Senior Civil Engineer
Senior Clerk
Senior Clerk Typist
Senior Data Entry Operator
Senior Drug Abuse Educator
Senior Engineering Aide
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Senior Engineering Inspector - 
Senior Environmental Analyst 
Senior Environmental Planner 
Senior Housing Inspector 
Senior Lighting Inspector 
Senior Mail Clerk 
Senior Micrographies Operator 
Senior Micrographics Technician 
Senior Neighborhood Aide 
Senior Planner 
Senior Plumbing Inspector 
Senior Program Analyst 
Senior Recreation Leader 
Senior Sanitation Inspector 
Senior Sign Inspector 
Senior Stenographer 
Senior Tax Cashier 
Senior Zoning Inspector 
Sign Inspector •
Site Plan Reviewer
Stenographer
Surveyor
Switchboard Operator 
Switchboard Supervisor 
Systems Analyst 
Systems Programmer 
Tax Cashier
Telecommunications Specialist 
Telecommunications Technician 
Traffic Engineer I 
Traffic Engineer II 
Traffic Engineer III 
T raffic T echnician I 
Traffic Technician II 
Traffic Technician III 
Volunteer Program Coordinator 
Youth Services Program Coordinator 
Youth Services Specialist 
Zoning Inspector
Zoning Inspector (Spanish Speaking)
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STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Petitioner,
- and -
ISLIP RESOURCE RECOVERY AGENCY,
Employer^
-and-
CITY EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. .
Intervenor.
CASE NO. C-6201
KOEHLER & ISAACS, LLP (LIAM L, CASTRO, ESQ., of counsel), for
Petitioner
ROBERT L.CICALE, ESQ., for Employer
ERIC M. HOFMEISTER, for Intervenor
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
On May 31,2013, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) filed, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees 
of the Islip Resource Recovery Agency (employer).
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate:
Included: All full-time drivers, loaders, foreman, mechanics and assistant
Excluded: All other employees.
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on September 18, 
2013, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner.
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective negotiations by the petitioner, the incumbent remains the exclusive 
representative of the unit employees and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed
DATED: October 15, 2013
mechanics.
Brooklyn, New York
/ •
/  Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of 
DAVID BARNARD,
Petitioner,
-and-
CASE NO. C-6199
COUNTY OF ONTARIO AND ONTARIO COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
Employer,
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Intervenor.
DAVID BARNARD, for Petitioner
JOHN W. PARK, ESQ., for Employer
STEVEN A. CRAIN, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Intervenor
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
On May 27, 2013, the David Barnard (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition for 
decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (intervenor), the current negotiating representative for employees in the
following negotiating unit:
Included: All full-time employees and all regularly scheduled part-time
employees within the same titles in the Ontario County Sheriff's 
Department.
Excluded: Sheriff, undersheriff, chief deputy sheriff, lieutenants, chief
correction officer, chief dispatcher, nursing director correctional 
facility, senior stenographer/secretary to the sheriff, county police 
officers, county police sergeants, investigators, seasonal 
employees.
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on September 27, 
2013. The results of the election show that a majority of eligible employees in the unit 
who cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor is decertified as the 
negotiating agent for the unit.
DATED: October 15, 2013,
Brooklyn, New York ' ^
^  Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of 
HELEN E. WEST,
Charging Party,
CASE NOS.
U-30848
U-31975
- and -
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
AFL-CIO,
Respondent,
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITYOF NEW YORK,
Employer.
HELEN E. WEST, pro se
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (ORIANA VIGLIOTTI of 
counsel), for Respondent
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (SETH J. BLAU of 
counsel), for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These cases come to the Board on exceptions by Helen E. West (West) to 
decisions of an Administrative Law Judge dismissing improper practice charges in Case 
Nos. U-308481 and U-31975,1 2 which alleged that the United Federation of Teachers,
1 45 PERB TJ4561 (2012).
2 46 PERB 1J4545 (2013).
Case Nos. U-30848 & U-31975 - 2 -
Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT) violated §§209-a.2(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to respond to her 
inquiries. UFT and the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York (District) oppose West’s exceptions.
In our prior decision in Case No. U-30848, we denied a request by West for an 
extension of time to file exceptions pursuant to §213.4 of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) to the ALJ’s decision dismissing the charge.3 We found that West had failed to 
articulate any facts to explain her extensive delay in making an application for an 
extension following receipt of the ALJ’s decision. Based upon our earlier decision, we 
deny West’s exceptions in Case No. U-30848 as untimely pursuant to §§213.2(a) and 
213.4 of the Rules.
i
We also deny West’s exceptions in Case No. U-31975. The ALJ in that case 
dismissed the charge on the ground that UFT did not have a continuing duty under the 
Act to represent West with respect to her inquiries made close to three years following 
her 2009 termination by the District.4 In her exceptions, West does not contest the 
ALJ’s conclusion that UFT did not have a duty under the Act to provide her with 
representation. Instead, the exceptions are limited to challenging the merits of the 
decision in Case No. U-30848, and asserting nejw allegations that she is a whistleblower
with certain physical and learning disabilities. The latter allegations were not included in
-\
V
3 46 PERB ^3001 (2013).
4 See generally, District Council 37, AFSCME (Maltsev), 41 PERB *[f3022 (2008)(setting 
forth and applying the standard under the Act concerning when an employee 
organization has a continuing duty to represent a former unit employee following 
separation from service.)
Case Nos. U-30848 & U-31975 - 3 -
her charges, and our improper practice jurisdiction is limited to alleged violations of
c
§209-a of the Act.5
Based upon the foregoing, we deny West’s exceptions and affirm the ALJ’s 
decision dismissing the charge in Case No. U-31975.
DATED: October 15, 2013
5 In the alternative, we would deny West’s exceptions in Case No. U-31975 based upon 
her failure to comply with §213.2(a) of the Rules by filing proof that she served her 
exceptions upon UFT and the District.
Brooklyn, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
in the Matter of 
NICHOLAS J. HIRSCH,
Charging Party,
-and- CASE NO. U-29886
ROCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Respondent,
-and-
ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Employer.
NICHOLAS J. HIRSCH, pro se
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD EISENSTEIN, 
of counsel), for Respondent
CHARLES G. JOHNSON, GENERAL COUNSEL (BETHANY A. CENTRONE of 
counsel), Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Nicholas J. Hirsch (Hirsch) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge, as amended, alleging that the Rochester Teachers Association (RTA) violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to 
arbitrate Hirsch’s grievance challenging his discharge as a substitute teacher by the 
Rochester City School District (District).1 The ALJ dismissed the charge based upon 
Hirsch’s failure to prosecute as demonstrated by his defiant disregard of the ALJ’s 
instructions despite prior warnings, his repeated refusal to proceed with the presentation 1
1 Pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act, the District is a statutory party to the charge.
Case No. U-29886
- 2-
of evidence, and his efforts to control the manner in which the hearing was conducted.2
In his exceptions, Hirsch alleges that the ALJ demonstrated bias and prejudice 
toward him throughout the hearing and denied him due process and equal protection. 
Hirsch asserts, inter alia, that the ALJ: denied his request for discovery; permitted a 
subpoenaed witness to testify out of order; engaged in ex parte communications with 
RTA’s counsel about calling the witness out of turn; insisted he present evidence rather 
than argument during his testimony; refused to permit testimony to be read back for 
clarification; deprived him of the right to question a witness during direct examination; 
permitted RTA’s counsel to repeatedly interrupt him and failed to warn or admonish 
RJA’s counsel; and acted inappropriately by describing his behavior during the hearing 
in her decision. Hirsch also asserts that the ALJ’s decision does not comply with our 
Rules of Procedure (Rules) because it purportedly includes false and defamatory 
statements. Finally, he asserts that he has been discriminated against as an indigent 
person in violation of his constitutional rights and that RTA violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
Act by failing to process his grievance to arbitration.
In support of his exceptions, Hirsch has submitted a DVD, which he asserts
i
includes audio and videotape recordings of hearings held before the ALJ on June 12, 
2012 and November 9, 2012 concerning his amended charge.3 Hirsch has also 
submitted handwritten notes by Marie J. Ruest (Ruest) along with an affidavit from her 
stating that her notes accurately reflect what took place during the hearings conducted
_______ ._________' k
2 46 PERB TJ4506 (2013). We previously denied a motion by Hirsch for leave to file 
exceptions aimed at compelling the ALJ to issue a written decision following the 
conclusion of the hearing. Rochester Teachers Assn (Hirsch), 45 PERB ]j3052 (2012).
3 Exceptions^ (A)(1)(h); Exhibit A.
Case No. U-29886 -3-
O  bytheALJon August 11, 2011, June 12, 2012 and November 9, 2012.4
RTA supports the ALJ’s decision and asserts that the surreptitiously created DVD 
recordings offered by Hirsch in support of his exceptions constitute misconduct because 
they prove that he violated the ALJ’s instruction that the parties shall not record the 
hearing. The District has not filed a response to the exceptions.
Based upon our review of the record, and the parties’ respective arguments, we 
deny Hirsch’s exceptions.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At the commencement of the first day of hearing on August 11, 2011, the ALJ
instructed the parties that the recording of the hearing was not permitted. Both Hirsch
and the Association’s counsel stated on the record that they understood the instruction.5
( ) The ALJ also read into the record a prehearing ruling that defined the scope of Hirsch’s
amended charge based upon his previously filed offer of proof:
Based on the charge as amended, and Mr. Hirsch’s letter of 
June 28, 2010, the charge is read to allege that the RTA 
violated its duty of fair representation to Mr. Hirsch in the 
manner in which it handled the grievance concerning his 
discharge. The charge asserts that the RTA refused to 
arbitrate Mr. Hirsch’s grievance and ceased representing 
him without a valid reason, after processing the grievance 
, through several stages of the grievance procedure. The
charge further alleges that Mr. Hirsch has a right to pursue 
the grievance without the RTA’s consent pursuant to the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
;l:[
4 Exceptions, Exhibit 5(a-c).
5 Transcript, p. 7. References in our decision to “Transcript” shall refer to the August 11, 
2011 hearing transcript and references to “Transcript II” refers to the November 9, 2012 
hearing transcript.
ra
Case No. U-29886 -4-
ln his June 28, 2010 correspondence Mr. Hirsch also makes 
allegations against the District, including that it improperly 
terminated him and that it violated his rights under the 
collective bargaining agreement. PERB has no jurisdiction 
over that aspect of the complaint, and further, the charge as 
amended alleges violations of the Act only by the RTA.
Thus the charge is being processed only as to the RTA.6
Before any witnesses were called to testify, the ALJ explained that the purpose of 
the hearing was to provide each party with an opportunity to present evidence 
concerning relevant facts, and ordered that any arguments premised on those facts and 
applicable case law be made in post-hearing briefs.7 Hirsch, however, took exception to 
the ALJ’s ruling,8 and attempted to make argument throughout his testimony.9
The ALJ permitted Hirsch to testify in narrative form and to utilize his notes 
during his direct testimony.10 1The ALJ also repeatedly encouraged him to speak 
slowly,11 urged him to calm down,12 granted him latitude to present background 
information about other grievances, permitted him to testify concerning his opinions 
about the District-RTA grievance procedure,13 and made arrangements for his exhibits
6 ALJ Exhibit 7; Transcript, pp. 9-10.
7 Transcript, pp. 12-15.
8 Transcript, pp. 14-15.
9 Transcript, pp. 55, 60-61, 62-64; Transcript II, pp. 17-19.
10 Transcript, pp. 23-24.
11 Transcript, pp. 22, 33, 37, 43, 50, 79; Transcript II, pp. 10, 18, 20.
12 Transcript, p. 192.
13 Transcript, pp. 60-63.
Case Np. U-29886 -5-
to be copied.14 in addition, the ALJ attempted to redirect Hirsch to testify about 
information directly related to his charge against RTA rather than claims of retaliation by 
the District that were not part of his charge.15 The ALJ also aided Hirsch by asking him 
at the initial close of his direct testimony whether he wanted his exhibits admitted into 
evidence.16 The ALJ, however, rejected Hirsch’s attempt to admit into evidence a 
surreptitious audiotape that he asserted included the recorded content of a prehearing 
conference held before an ALJ regarding his charge.17
Prior to RTA’s cross-examination of Hirsch, the ALJ permitted RTA to call a 
subpoenaed witness, the District’s Director of Recruitment Narlene Ragans (Ragans), to 
testify out of order “because she has to get back to the district.”18 At the time, Hirsch did 
not object to the accommodation extended to the witness.19
During her direct testimony, Ragans described the background to, and the events, 
at, a September 13, 2009' meeting she held with Hirsch and RTA representative 
Jonathan H. Hickey (Hickey) concerning written complaints received from different 
District schools about Hirsch’s performance.20 She also testified about Hirsch’s attempt
14 Transcript, pp. 40-45.
15 ALJ Exhibit 7, Transcript, pp. 53, 69-70.
16 Transcript, p. 80.
17 Transcript, pp. 67-69.
18 Transcript, pp. 80-81. The record suggests that the courtesy granted to the 
subpoenaed witness was arranged during a brief recess. Transcript, p. 81.
19 Transcript, pp. 81. He did, however, express his objection when the hearing resumed 
on November 9, 2012. Transcript II, p. 11.
20 Transcript, pp. 87-104; Union Exhibits 1,2, 3.
to tape record the meeting,21 her ending the meeting because of Hirsch’s behavior,22 
and the District’s decision to discharge him on February 27, 2009 for performance 
deficiencies.23 During Hirsch’s cross-examination of Ragans he threatened to “walk out 
the door” after the ALJ sustained an RTA evidentiary objection. 24 At the conclusion of 
his cross-examination, the ALJ denied Hirsch’s motion to strike Ragans’ testimony on 
relevancy grounds.25 Following her testimony, RTA proceeded with its cross- 
examination of Hirsch. On cross-examination, Hirsch acknowledged RTA’s prior 
successful representation of him after the District had terminated him in 2006.26 
Thereafter, Hirsch called Ruest to testify on his behalf. Ruest testified that during 
Hirsch’s incarceration following his conviction for perjury, she communicated with RTA 
representative Hickey who told her that after Hirsch was released from jail, RTA would - 
discuss resuming the arbitration.27 Following Ruest’s testimony, the ALJ permitted 
Hirsch to re-call himself as a witness.28
On October 13, 2011, Hirsch filed a written motion asking the ALJ to recuse
21 Transcript, p. 104.
22 Transcript, pp. 101-106. J
23 Transcript, pp. 108-109; Union Exhibit 4.
24 Transcript, p. 138.
25 Transcript, pp. 150-153.
26 Transcript, pp. 153-155, Charging Party Exhibit 2.
27 Transcript, pp. 186-190. According to testimony at the hearing, Hirsch’s conviction for 
perjury was overturned. Transcript II, p. 31.
28 Transcript, pp. 204-206. Hirsch called Ruest to testify after his effort to have her 
affidavit admitted into evidence was denied. Transcript, pp. 55-57.
Case No. U-29886 _g_
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herself based upon her evidentiary and procedural rulings on the first day of hearing. In 
addition, he filed a motion requesting that he be permitted to proceed as a poor 
person.29 The ALJ denied both motions.30
A second day of hearing was conducted on June 12, 2012. Following the 
hearing, the private stenographer used by our agency to transcribe the hearing 
announced his retirement and stated that he was not able to produce a transcript from 
that hearing date The ALJ advised the parties of the development, informed them that 
the second day of hearing would have to be repeated, and scheduled the hearing to 
resume on November 9, 2012. Prior to the resumption of the hearing, the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) responded to a letter from 
Hirsch concerning the transcript. In his letter, the Director.stated that the private 
stenographer had retired from his business and was not able to produce a transcript of 
his stenographic notes from the second day of hearing.31
When the hearing resumed on November 9, 2012, Hirsch was permitted to take 
the stand for purposes of continuing his direct testimony in narrative form. He was also 
permitted to recall Ruest to testify.
Prior to the resumption of Hirsch’s testimony, he made a motion for discovery of 
the notes taken by RTA representative Hickey at the September 13, 2009 meeting with 
the District.32 After the motion was denied, Hirsch continued to argue with the ALJ,
29 ALJ Exhibit 9.
1 . , /
30 ALJ Exhibit 10.
31 Exceptions , Exhibit 3.
32 Transcript II, pp. 8-13.
Case No. U-29886
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resisting her efforts to have the hearing proceed in an orderly fashion.33 During a 
colloquy, the ALJ placed Hirsch on notice that if he continued to ignore her instructions 
the hearing would be ended:
That’s enough on this point. Now I’m going to caution you at 
this point, if you do not follow my instructions, we’re stopping 
and this will go no further. Okay? Do you understand that?
Just yes or no.34
Despite repeated directives from the ALJ, Hirsch continued to utilize his direct 
testimony to make argument rather than present facts.35 This led the ALJ to sustain 
objections from RTA’s counsel and to order Hirsch to abide by her rulings.36 She also 
had to direct Hirsch to sit down.37 .
During the course of Ruest’s testimony, the ALJ sustained an objection by RTA’s 
counsel to a question concerning her expenses for attending the hearing.38 According to 
Hirsch, the question was relevant to a notice of claim he had filed in connection with a 
planned lawsuit.39 At another point, the ALJ overruled Hirsch’s direction to the 
stenographer to read back the wording of an RTA evidentiary objection,40 with the ALJ 
reiterating her authority over the conduct of the hearing. The ALJ also had to direct
33 Transcript II. pp. 13-16.
34 Transcript II, p. 16.
35 Transcript II, pp. 17-26.
36 Transcript II, pp. 26-27.
37 Transcript 11, pp. 27-28.
38 Transcript II, pp. 32-33.
39 Transcript II, p. 33.
40 Transcript II, pp. 41-42.
Case No. U-29886 -9-
Hirsch during the hearing to discontinue his outbursts:
I am telling you, one more outburst like that, we’re stopping 
This is not how a hearing is conducted. You don’t argue with 
counsel. You don’t explode every time you hear something 
you don’t agree with.41
In response, Hirsch commenced an argument with the ALJ over the definition of 
the word “explode”:
Let’s get the dictionary and look up explode.
If you want to say I’m exploding, then let’s define that. I’m 
not exploding -  42
As a result of Hirsch’s unwillingness to abide by her directives, the ALJ ended the 
hearing and informed the parties of her intention to dismiss the charge based upon 
Hirsch’s conduct43
DISCUSSION
We begin with Hirsch’s request that we consider materials submitted in support 
of his exceptions, which are outside of the record: a DVD that purportedly contains 
audio and video recordings of the hearings held on June 12, 2012 and November 9, 
2012; and the handwritten notes of Ruest along with her affidavit stating that the notes 
accurately reflect what took place during the hearings conducted on August 11,2011, 
June 12, 2012 and November 9, 2012.
41 Transcript II, p. 43.
42 Transcript II, p. 43.
43 Transcript II, p. 43.
Case No. U-29886
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Section 213.2 of the Rules limits our review of an ALJ’s decision to the record 
that was before her or him.44 Neither the DVD nor Ruest’s notes and affidavit are part 
of the record considered by the ALJ and, therefore, we decline to consider them.
To the extent that Hirsch’s representation that the DVD includes recordings from 
the June 12, 2012 and November 9, 2012 hearing dates-is accurate, it constitutes 
evidence of misconduct under §212(j) of our Rules. The recording of the hearings 
violated the ALJ’s clear and explicit order against such recordings. Even without the 
ALJ’s ruling, we would find generally that the secret recording of a hearing and/or a 
prehearing conference in a case before our agency constitutes misconduct under 
§212(j) of our Rules warranting an appropriate sanction. In light of our decision below, 
however, we do not need to review the content of the DVD to determine whether it 
demonstrates misconduct warranting a sanction in this case.
Next, we consider Hirsch’s claim that the ALJ demonstrated bias and prejudice, 
and denied him due process and equal protection. Following our review of the record, 
we find no support for his assertions. Indeed, the ALJ permitted him to testify in 
narrative form, allowed him to recall himself as a witness, repeatedly encouraged him to 
speak slowly and to calm down, redirected him to testify about information directly 
related to his charge, allowed him to testify concerning his opinions about the District- 
RTA grievance procedure, made arrangements for his exhibits to be copied, and 
ensured that his exhibits were admitted into evidence at the close of his initial direct 
testimony. In addition, we find no support for Hirsch’s claim that the ALJ’s decision
44 CSEA (Paganini), 36 PERB 1J3006 (2003).
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contains false and defamatory statements. Rather, it contains the ALJ’s description of 
Hirsch’s behavior during the hearing that is supported by the record.
The ALJ’s denial of Hirsch’s discovery request does not constitute a denial of due 
process and equal protection or demonstrate bias and prejudice.45 Under the State 
Administrative Procedure Act §305, New York administrative agencies have the 
discretion to adopt procedural rules concerning pre-hearing discovery and our Rules do 
not mandate discovery by the parties.46
Similarly, we reject Hirsch’s exceptions premised upon the ALJ permitting RTA 
witness Ragans to testify out of order. Under our Rules, an ALJ is granted considerable 
discretion in the-conduct of a hearing and in developing a full record.47 The ALJ’s 
decision to accbmmodate the schedule of the subpoenaed witness by permitting her to 
testify out of turn was well within the ALJ’s discretion. Furthermore, Hirsch did not 
object to the ruling at the time the RTA witness testified, and the record establishes he 
had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Although Hirsch claims 
that the ALJ engaged in purported ex parte communications with RTA’s counsel 
concerning the subpoenaed witness, there is nothing in the record to support that 
accusation.
45 UFT and Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Jenkins), 4T PERB 
U3007 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 41 
PERB • U7007 (Sup Ct NY County 2008), affd 67AD3d 567, 42 PERB lf7008 (1st Dept 
2009), app den, 43 PERB ^7003 (1st Dept 2010); Rochester Teachers Assn (Falso), 45 
PERB *[13033 (2012) confirmed sub nom Falso v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 46 
PERB ff7003 (Sup Ct Albany County 2013).
46 UFT (Tulloch), 45 PERB P035 (2012).
47 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Ruiz), 43 PERB fj3022 
(2010); City of Elmira, 41 PERB P 0 1 8 (2008).
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We also reject Hirsch’s exceptions.premised upon the ALJ’s evidentiary rulings, 
and her repeated efforts to maintain order and decorum during the hearing. The 
purpose of a lay witness testifying at a hearing is to present personal knowledge of 
relevant facts. The ALJ’s repeated directives requiring Hirsch to set forth facts rather 
than make argument while testifying are fully consistent with applicable evidentiary rules 
and well within her discretion. Similarly, the other evidentiary rulings challenged by 
Hirsch, along with the ALJ’s efforts to have him comply with her directives, were well 
within her discretion and do not constitute reversible error. Contrary to Hirsch’s 
exceptions, RTA’s counsel had a right to make evidentiary objections during Hirsch’s 
testimony and those objections did not constitute misconduct warranting admonishment.
f
There is no evidence in the record to support Hirsch’s claim that he was 
discriminated against as an indigent person. Although Hirsch’s motion to proceed as a . 
poor person was denied by the ALJ, it does not constitute proof of discrimination. Our 
Rules are silent regarding a procedure to seek poor person status. To the extent that 
we are obligated in a particular case to grant such status, New York’s civil procedure 
rules provide guidance. To obtain permission to proceed as a poor person in state
court, an individual must file an affidavit:
/
setting forth the amount and sources of his or her income 
and listing his or her property with its value; that he or she is 
unable to pay the costs, fees and expenses necessary to. 
prosecute or defend the action or to maintain or respond to 
the appeal; the nature of the action; sufficient facts so that 
the merit of the contentions can be ascertained; and whether 
any other person is beneficially interested in any recovery 
sought and, if so, whether every such person is unable to 
pay such costs, fees and expenses.48
48 CPLR §1101 (a).
Case No. U-29886 -13-
In the present case, Hirsch’s affidavit in support of his motion to the ALJ fails to set forth 
sufficient facts to demonstrate an entitlement to poor person status. The insufficiency of 
his application is supported by the prior denials made by the Appellate Division, Fourth 
Department concerning his motions seeking the same relief in unrelated litigation.49
. Finally, Hirsch did not file an exception to the ALJ’s rationale for dismissing his 
charge: his defiant misbehavior during the hearing constitutes a failure to prosecute the 
charge. Therefore, that issue has been waived.50 Even if Hirsch had filed such an 
exception, we would have affirmed the ALJ’s decision based upon the totality of his 
conduct during the hearing. It is well-settled that the failure of a charging party to 
prosecute a charge is grounds for dismissal.51 In the present case, the totality of 
Hirsch’s conduct during the hearing including his repeated refusal to abide by the ALJ’s 
directives and his defiance of the ALJ’s authority demonstrate an abuse of our 
procedures warranting dismissal of the charge.52
49 See, Hirsch and Ruest v City of Rochester, 2009 NY Slip Op 72900(U) (4th Dept 
2009); Hirsch v Sturgis, 2010 NY Slip Op 76432(U) (4th Dept 2010); Hirsch v Sturgis, 
2010 NY Slip Op 80669(U) (4th Dept 2010).
50 Section 213.2(b)(4) of the Rules; UFT(Hunt), 45 PERB K3038 (2012).
51 CSEA (Paganini), supra, note 44.
52 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Greenberg)\ 16 PERB 
^3067 (1983); Bd of Educ. of the City Sch of the City of New York (Behrens), 15 PERB 
P042 (1982); UFT (Goldstein), 42 PERB P035 (2009).
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Based upon the foregoing, Hirsch’s exceptions are denied, and his charge is 
dismissed.
DATED: October 15, 2013
Albany, New York
y //iL frv n J ^
Jerome Lefkov^rtz, Chairperson
Sheila S. Cole, Member
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the State of New York 
(Department of Transportation) (State) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) alleging that the State violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
terminated a past practice by imposing a rule prohibiting CSEA-represented unit 
employees from continuing to listen to music on personal electronic devices and 
radios at their respective work stations at the Hamburg facility of New York State 
Department of Transportation (DOT).1 In reaching her decision, the ALJ concluded 
that the subject of CSEA’s improper practice charge is a term and condition of 
employment and, therefore, a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act 
because it relates to the comfort and convenience of the employees.
1 46 PERB TJ4518 (2013).
Case No. U-30650 - 2 -
EXCEPT1QNS
In its exceptions, the State asserts that the ALJ erred by concluding that the ■ 
at-issue subject constitutes a term and condition of employment that is mandatorily 
negotiable under the Act. In addition, the State challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that 
it unilaterally changed an enforceable past practice under the Act. Finally, it asserts 
that the ALJ’s decision and remedial order conflicts with its legal obligations to 
reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).2 CSEA supports the ALJ’s decision.
Following our review of the record and the parties’ respective arguments, we 
affirm the ALJ’s decision.
FACTS
The record before us is limited to a stipulation of facts, along with a redacted
copy of a settlement agreement reached between DOT and a DOT employee at the
(
Hamburg facility resolving a charge of disability discrimination that had been filed with 
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).3
For at least 10 years prior to December 2010, CSEA-represented unit 
employees working at the Hamburg facility, with the knowledge of DOT, have been 
permitted to play radios during the workday at their respective work stations. In or 
about 2006, the above-referenced employee at the DOT facility, who is a member of 
the CSEA-represented unit, requested that DOT prohibit the playing of radios in the 
workplace as a reasonable accommodation for his hearing impairment because the 
noise caused by the multiple radios interfered with his ability to perform his job duties.
-------------- :---------------------  i
2 42 USC §12101, et seq.
3 Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit A.
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Based on the reasonable accommodation request, DOT implemented a rule in 2006 
that permitted employees at the facility to continue playing radios at their respective 
work stations but mandated that the volume not exceed a specified decibel level.
In 2008, the employee who had requested the accommodation filed his charge 
of discrimination with EEOC alleging that DOT violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (Title VII) and the ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate him because 
the decibel limitation imposed in 2006 had not been adhered to and enforced by 
DOT. The employee was represented before the EEOC by private counsel rather 
than CSEA, which was not a named respondent in the discrimination charge.
' ' "V
In November 2010, a settlement was reached between the employee and
DOT concerning his EEOC charge and a related charge pending at the New York
State Division of Human Rights. CSEA was not a party to the settlement agreement.
DOT agreed in the settlement, inter alia, to do the following:
That, within thirty (30) calendar days of the effective date of this 
agreement:
i) it will prohibit the playing of radios in the shop to 
which the Charging Party is assigned, including in 
state vehicles being worked on and including the 
area outside the shop but on state property;4
As part of the settlement, DOT did not admit to violating Title VII or the New
York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL),5 and the DOT employee agreed that he
/
would not pursue a lawsuit under Title VII or NYSHRL. The settlement agreement 
was reviewed and approved by the EEOC Buffalo Office Director. As a result of the 
settlement, the EEOC’s investigation was terminated without any determination
4Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit A. 1J8(b).
5 Exec Law §290, et seq.
Case No. U-30650 - 4 -
concerning the merits of the discrimination charge.
Based on the terms of the settlement, DOT unilaterally imposed a rule on or 
about December 3, 2010, prohibiting all employees at its Hamburg facility, including 
CSEA-represented unit employees, from playing radios during the workday at their 
respective work stations. It is undisputed that CSEA did not agree to the new rule, 
and DOT did not seek to negotiate with CSEA regarding the rule.
Notably, the stipulated record lacks relevant probative evidence concerning 
the State’s interests in imposing the ban, including a description of the at-issue 
workplace,6 the duties and responsibilities performed there, the number of unit 
employees, the number of unit employees participating in the practice, the number 
and nature of complaints received about the practice, the public’s accessibility to the 
work location, the scope and nature of workplace sounds from other sources, the 
existence of conflicts in the workplace over musical preferences, and whether the 
State considered other ways to reasonably accommodate the employee with the 
hearing impairment without imposing a total ban on the playing of music.
DISCUSSION
We begin with the State’s exceptions challenging the ALJ’s conclusion that the 
subject of employees listening to personal electronic musical devices and radios 
during the workday is a term and condition of employment and mandatorily 
negotiable under the Act because it relates to employee comfort and convenience.
6 The State references the facility as a garage in its brief. Memorandum on Behalf of 
the State of New York, pp. 5-6. However, the record before us is silent concerning 
the nature of the DOT facility.
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In City of Albany,7 8we reiterated the applicable balancing test for determining
whether a particular subject is mandatorily negotiable under the Act:
[We have] long applied a balancing test to determine 
whether a unilateral promulgation or alteration of a work 
rule violates the Act. In applying this balancing test, we 
examine the record to determine whether there is 
preponderance of credible evidence to demonstrate that 
the employer’s need for a particular mission-related work 
rule outweighs the effect that the rule has on the 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment. The 
mere fact that a work rule has a relationship to an 
employer’s mission does not permit an employer to act 
unilaterally in any manner it deems appropriate.9 Rather, 
an employer can unilaterally impose a work rule only to 
the extent that the unilateral action does not significantly 
or unnecessarily intrude on the protected interests of 
bargaining unit employees under the Act. Therefore, 
under the balancing test the burden rests with the 
employer to demonstrate that the new work rule does not 
go beyond what is necessary to further its mission.10 1
(Footnotes in original).
As a result, our determination with respect to whether a particular employer 
workplace decision is mandatorily negotiable requires a fact-specific examination of 
employer and employee interests.11
In the present case, the State contends that the ALJ failed to properly apply 
the balancing test by concluding that the comfort and convenience of employees in 
listening to music at work is a term and condition of employment that outweighs what
7 42 PERB fl3005 at 3007 (2009).
8 County of Rensselaer, 13 PERB ^3080 (1980); Steuben-Allegany BOCES, 13 
PERB T3096 (1980); State of New York (Governor’s Office of Employee Relations), 
18 PERB 1J3064 (1985).
9 County of Montgomery, 18 PERB P077 (1985).
10 County of Niagara (Mount View Health Facility), 21 PERB fi3014 (1988).
11 Nanuet Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB 1J3007 (2012).
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the State describes as its “managerial interest in providing all employees a work 
environment wherein each can effectively perform their job duties without undue 
interference from the personal noise and music preferences of other employees.”12 13
We disagree.
First, we reject the State’s argument that listening to music at work does not 
constitute a term and condition of employment under the Act. While the subject does 
not have the same objective level of importance as salaries, wages, hours and other 
terms and conditions, it is a workplace benefit that clearly affects the comfort of 
employees. As the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recognized in White 
Pine, lnc,n  the threatened elimination of the privilege of listening to the radio in the 
workplace is a threat to impose more onerous working conditions on the employees. 
Furthermore, the subject is analogous to other working conditions that we have found 
to be a mandatory subject because they affect employees’ comfort and 
convenience.14
Contrary to the State’s argument, our precedent concerning employees’ 
interest in comfort and convenience does not require that the benefit have an
12 Memorandum on Behalf of the State of New York, p. 6.
13 213 NLRB 566(1974).-
14 See Scarsdale PBA, 8 PERB fl3075 (1975) and Police Assn of New Rochelle, Inc, 
10 PERB TJ3042 (1977)(air conditioning in police vehicles); Local 294, IBT, 10 PERB 
^3007 (1977) (air conditioning and split level seats in police vehicles); County of 
Niagara (Mount View Health Facility), supra, note 10 (restrictions on employee 
smoking in workplace areas not customarily used by resident patients); State of New 
York (Dept of Taxation and Finance), 30 PERB TJ3028 (1997)(restrictions on wearing 
jeans in the workplace); County of Nassau, 32 PERB TJ3034 (1999)(the provision of 
free bottled spring water); State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 
38 PERB TJ3008 (2005)(limitations on containers used by employees to carry 
personal food).
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economic component. The fact that we have found some subjects to. be mandatory 
because they affect comfort and convenience and have an economic consequence,15 *
does not mean that the latter is a necessity for purposes of our negotiability analysis.
Based upon the record before us, we conclude that the State failed to meet its 
evidentiary burden of demonstrating that its interests outweigh the interests of the 
unit employees in continuing to listen to music at work. The State did not present any 
evidence concerning the physical layout and structure of the workplace, the public’s 
accessibility, the work performed by unit employees, the amount and volume of 
sound created by other sources, the number of employees involved in the practice, 
the number of other employees who might have complained about the music or that 
there have been conflicts in the workplace over musical preferences. Furthermore, 
the State failed to demonstrate that the unilateral imposition of the ban on listening to 
music on personal electronic devices and radios at work stations does not go beyond 
what is necessary to meet its managerial interests. - For example, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the State-considered less intrusive alternatives including
i
more aggressively enforcing the 2006 decibel limitation or requiring employees to 
utilize employer-supplied headphones.
Next, we turn to the State’s contention that CSEA failed to prove the existence 
of an enforceable past practice. Under the applicable test for determining the 
presence of a binding past practice, the charging party must demonstrate that the 
practice was unequivocal and continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient
15 See County of Nassau, supra, note 14; Saratoga County Deputy Sheriffs
Benevolent Assn, 37 PERB 1J3024 (2004), revd on other grounds, County of 
Saratoga v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 21 AD3d 1160, 38 PERB TI7013 (3d 
Dept 2005). .
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upder the facts and circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the 
affected unit employees that the practice would continue.16 That prima facie showing 
is subject to an employer's affirmative defense that it lacked actual or constructive 
knowledge of the practice. In the present case, the evidence reveals that the at- 
issue practice at the Hamburg facility existed for at least 10 years with DOT’S 
knowledge, which we find created a reasonable expectation that the practice would 
continue. The fact that the practice was modified in 2006 by imposing a maximum
t,
decibel level does not undermine the unequivocal and continued nature of the 
practice of permitting employees to listen to music on their own devices or radios 
during the workday. -
In addition, we reject the State’s reliance on its statutory obligation under the 
ADA to provide a reasonable accommodation to the unit employee with the hearing 
impairment and the settlement.reached with that employee.
Legally and historically, collective bargaining and civil rights are intertwined 
branches of the same tree. Both employers and labor organizations are covered 
entities under the ADA and the provisions of Title I of the ADA do not constitute a 
license for unilateral actions by employers in contravention of the duty to negotiate
------------------------- :----- r
16 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB1J3012 (2007), remanded, 42 PERB 
114527 (2009), affd, 43 PERB 1J3017 (2010), confd sub nom, Chenango Forks Cent 
Sch Dist v New York State Pub Emp Rel Bd, 95 AD3d 1479, 45 PERB 1J7006 (3d 
Dept 2012) affd, 21NY3d 255, 46 PERB fi7008 (2013). 17
17 42 USC §12111(2).
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under the Act or in violation of an established seniority system.18 The obligation of a 
covered entity to accommodate an individual’s disability under the ADA is subject to . 
the undue hardship limitation set forth in 42 USC §12112(b)(5)(A).19 Based upon that 
limitation, the EEOC expressly encourages employers to engage the labor 
organization representing the employees at the workplace for purposes of developing 
an acceptable accommodation.20
Representation by an employee organization of a unit member seeking a 
reasonable accommodation for a physical or mental impairment is well within the 
representational rights guaranteed by §§202 and 203 of the Act. The fact that the 
unit employee in the present case was not represented by CSEA in seeking an
18 See Industria Lechera De Puerto Rico, Inc, 344 NLRB 1075 (2005); US Airways, 
Inc v Barnett, 535 US 391 (2002). The duty to negotiate under §209-a.1 (d) of the Act 
is not suspended or nullified because the subject matter relates in some manner to 
laws prohibiting workplace discrimination. See Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch 
Dist, 30 PERB T]3041 (1997)(employer violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by 
unilaterally imposing certain internal investigatory procedures concerning complaints 
of sexual harassment made against unit employees); County of Erie and Erie County 
Sheriff, 36 PERB 1J3021 (2003), confirmed sub nom. County of Erie and Erie County 
Sheriff v State of New York, 14 AD3d 14, 37 PERB ^7008 (3d Dept 2004) (employer 
violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it refused an employee organization’s 
request for relevant materials from the employer’s EEO and internal affairs files to 
enable the employee organization to determine the merits of a disciplinary grievance 
by a unit member challenging his discharge for sexual harassment). In addition, legal 
protections under the Act can overlap with similar protections provided by 
employment discrimination laws. See Long Beach City Sch Dist and Long Beach 
Administrators’ Union (Fail-Maynard), 43 PERB 1J3024 (2010)(the duty of fair 
representation doctrine codified in §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act originated in case 
law involving claims of racially motivated unequal treatment by private sector unions).
19 The NYSHRL also includes an undue hardship limitation to the obligation to 
provide a reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee. See Exec Law
§§292.21-e and 296.3(b). See also Romanello v Intesa Sanpaolo,__NY3d__, 2013
NY Slip Op 06600 (Oct 10, 2013).
20 EEOC Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, §3.9.
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accommodation did not give the State the right to unilaterally change the terms and 
conditions of employment for all unit employees at the facility. There is no evidence 
demonstrating that DOT sought CSEA’s participation in the interactive process 
concerning the requested accommodation or even communicated with CSEA prior to 
imposing the at-issue ban on listening to music at the facility.
It is incumbent upon us to emphasize the narrowness of our decision requiring 
the State in this case to engage in the statutorily mandated process of collective 
negotiations with respect to eliminating the past practice of employees listening to 
music during the workday at the Hamburg facility. This case involves the unilateral 
imposition of a total ban on such activities in that facility in contravention of a binding 
past practice; where the State failed to meet its evideptiary burden of demonstrating 
that its interests in imposing the ban outweighed the interests of the employees.
Finally, in response to concerns expressed by the State in its exceptions, we 
underscore that our decision should not be interpreted as holding that the subject is 
mandatorily negotiable in every workplace regardless of demonstrable employer 
interests or that employees have a. right under the Act to listen to music in the 
workplace. Under different facts and circumstances stemming from a more complete 
record, we might very well have found that the'State met its burden under the 
balancing test. Furthermore, our decision should not be construed as indicating any 
obligation under the Act to negotiate over employee musical preferences whether 
they are Chopin or Schoenberg, Monk or Mingus, Ella or Hendrix.
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the State violated the Act by 
unilaterally terminating the past practice of allowing unit employees to listen to 
personal electronic musical devices and radios at their respective work stations at the
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Hamburg facility. Therefore, the State is hereby ordered to:
1. Cease and desist from prohibiting unit employees from listening to 
personal electronic musical devices and radios at their respective work 
stations at the Fleet Administration Building in Hamburg, New York, 
without prior negotiations with CSEA;
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees.
DATED: October 15, 2013 .
Brooklyn, New York
-
Jerome Lefk/witz,/Chairperson
Sheila S. Cole, Board Member
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of 
Transportation) in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) that the State of New 
York will: r
Not prohibit unit employees from listening to personal electronic musical 
devices and radios at their respective work stations at the Fleet 
Administration Building in Hamburg, New York, without prior 
negotiations with CSEA.
Dated B y ...................................... ..................
on behalf of STATE OF NEW YORK 
(DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION)
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, 
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO,
- and -
Charging Party,
CASE NO. U-29549
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (ORIANA VIGLIOTTI of counsel) for 
Charging Party
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (KELLIE TERESE 
WALKER of counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York (District) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally implemented new Speech 
and Language Standards of Practice (standards of practice) upon UFT-represented 
speech teachers, which significantly increased their workload and extended their
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extended their workday, and when the District refused to negotiate the impact of the 
new standards with UFT.1
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that UFT failed to 
demonstrate that the District’s unilateral imposition of the new standards of practice 
substantially increased the teachers’ workload and workday thereby violating §209- 
a.1(d) of Act. In addition, the ALJ dismissed UFT’s claim that the District violated its 
duty to negotiate the impact of.its decision in violation of §209-a.1(d) of Act on the basis 
that the charge fails to allege sufficient facts to set forth that claim under the Act.
EXCEPTIONS
In its exceptions, UFT asserts that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed 
because it failed to examine the facts under our precedent holding that the assignment 
of additional duties extending the workday of unit employee constitutes a mandatory 
subject of negotiations under the Act. UFT also excepts to the ALJ’s finding that there 
is insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that the District’s unilateral action 
sufficiently increased the teachers’ workload to constitute a violation of §209-a.1(d) of 
Act. In the alternative, UFT requests that the case be remanded for further evidentiary 
findings with respect to whether the workload was increased on a day-to-day basis. In 
addition, it requests that the Board adopt a new standard for determining when a 
workload increase constitutes a violation of §209-a.1(d) of Act. Finally, UFT contends 
that the ALJ erred in concluding that the charge did not allege that it demanded to 
negotiate the impact of the District’s decision, and that the District refused. The District
1 45 PERBH4574 (2012).
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supports the ALJ’s decision.
Based upon our review of UFT’s exceptions, and the District’s response, we 
reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand the case for further processing consistent with 
our decision.
DISCUSSION
We begin with UFT’s exception challenging the ALJ’s dismissal of UFT’s claim
that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of Act by refusing to negotiate the impact of its
decision to impose the new standards of procedure on UFT-represented teachers. In
her decision, the ALJ concluded the charge failed to allege that UFT demanded impact
negotiations, and that the District rejected the demand. T
In its charge, UFT alleges that it sent a letter dated May 18, 2009 to the District’s
Director of Labor Relations concerning the new standards, which stated, in part:
There is a need for bargaining between the UFT and the 
[District] with respect to these Standards since, among other ; 
things, they affect the workload of UFT-represented speech 
improvement teachers. Indeed, the new standards create a 
substantial amount of new work which must be completed in 
specified amount of time and which is in addition to all of the 
other work previously required of speech teachers.2
In addition, the charge alleges that on June 19, 2009, UFT representatives met with
District representatives to discuss the new standards of procedure.3 It also alleges that
the District refused to negotiate both the decision to implement and the impact of those
2 ALJ Exhibit 1, ^6. The full body of the letter is attached to the charge as Exhibit A.
3 ALJ Exhibit 1,117.
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standards.4 In its answer, the District admits receiving UFT’s May 18, 2009 letter but 
denies that it refused to negotiate the implementation or the impact of the new 
standards with UFT.5
Based upon our review of UFT’s May 18, 2009 letter and the allegations of the 
charge, we reverse the ALJ’s dismissal of UFT’s claim that the District violated §209- 
a.1(d) of Act by refusing to negotiate the impact of the standards on UFT-represented 
teachers, The May 18, 2009 letter demanded that the District commence decisional 
and impact negotiations concerning the standards. Furthermore, the charge expressly 
alleges that the District refused to engage in impact negotiations. Therefore, we 
conclude that the charge’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim that the District 
violated its duty to engage in impact negotiations, and remand the case to the ALJ to 
determine whether the District violated its duty under the Act. Nothing in our decision 
precludes the ALJ, at her discretion, from reopening the record for purposes of 
receiving offers of proof and/or additional evidence from the parties with respect to the 
allegation that the District violated its duty to negotiate over the impact of the 
implementation of the standards.6
We next turn to UFT’s assertion that the ALJ erred in failing to examine the facts 
based upon our case law holding that an employer’s unilateral assignment of additional
4 ALJ Exhibit 1,^10.
5 ALJ Exhibit 2.
6 The District’s sole witness, Director of the Center for Assistance Technology Judy 
Manning, testified that she was not aware of UFT’s May 18, 2009 letter and did not 
know whether the District responded. Transcript, p. 993.
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duties can violate §209-a.1(d) of Act by extending the workday of the at-issue unit 
employees. It is well-settled that an employer is obligated to negotiate a decision to 
assign new duties to unit employees that results in the lengthening of the employees’ 
workday, even though those duties are inherently a part of the employees’ occupation.7 
The ALJ’s decision in the present case, however, is silent with respect to the precedent 
establishing that principle. Instead, it appears that the ALJ’s analysis concerning the 
alleged lengthening of the workday was premised upon the standard that we utilize for 
determining whether the imposition of an increased workload is mandatorily 
negotiable.8
In light of the ambiguity in the ALJ’s decision concerning the standard applied in 
finding that the workday of the unit employees-was not lengthened, it is necessary for 
us to reverse and remand the decision for a clarification before reviewing the ALJ’s 
conclusion that LIFT failed to prove that the District’s unilateral action significantly 
increased the workload of unit employers or extended their workday in violation of the 
§209-a.1(d) of Act.
Upon remand, the ALJ may, at her discretion, reopen the record for the parties to 
present offers of proof and/or additional evidence with respect to the claim that the 
District’s decision to unilaterally impose the standards of practice violated §209-a.1(d)
7 See Sackets Harbor Cent Sch Dist, 13 PERB 1)3058 (1980); South Jefferson Cent Sch 
Dist, 13 PERB 1)3066 (1980).
8 New Rochelle Housing Auth, 21 PERB 1)3054 (1988); Edgemont Union Free Sch Dist 
at Greenburgh, 21 PERB 1)3067 (1988).
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of Act. In addition, the ALJ may request that the parties submit supplemental legal 
arguments regarding the applicable benchmark in the present case for determining 
whether the UFT-represented employees’ workload has been significantly increased by 
the District’s unilateral action.
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ’s decision is reversed and the case
remanded for further processing consistent with this decision.
DATED: October 15, 2013 
Brooklyn, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Yonkers (City) 
seeking to overturn a decision of the Director of Conciliation (Director) dated June 21, 
2013, declining to process the City’s petition for interest arbitration concerning an 
impasse for the period July 1 ,2009-June 30, 2011, and the Director’s decision dated 
August 6, 2013, declining to process another City petition for interest arbitration 
concerning a purported impasse for the period July 1, 2011-June 30, 2013.
The Director’s initial decision was based upon our holding in City of Kingston^ 
and the response by the Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Local 628) 
objecting to the processing of the petition and consenting to have the terms of the 1
1 18 PERB H3036 (1985).
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expired collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) continue pursuant to §209-a.1(e) 
of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act). In City of Kingston we concluded 
that, under the Act, an employer does not have the right to proceed to interest 
arbitration without the employee organization’s consent.
In his subsequent decision, the Director declined to process the City’s second 
petition on the grounds that its exceptions were pending concerning his prior decision 
and, therefore, proceeding with the impasse procedure would be premature and 
speculative. In addition, the Director found that the City’s petition failed to demonstrate 
that negotiations regarding the at-issue period had taken place, that there had been a 
determination that an impasse exists, and that mediation had taken place.
EXCEPTIONS
In its exceptions, the City contends that our holding in the City of Kingston should 
be reversed because it is inconsistent with §209.4(c)(i) of the Act and §205.4 of our 
Rules of Procedure (Rules). In the alternative, the City seeks a determination that.Local 
628 has waived its right to negotiate over, or to subsequently seek to arbitrate, the 
terms and conditions of employment for the periods 2009-2011 and 2011-2013 following 
the expiration of the agreement. Local 628 supports the Director’s decision based upon 
City of Kingston and asserts that the City’s alternative waiver argument is meritless.
DISCUSSION
Our holding in City of Kingston was premised upon the wording of §209-a.1(e) of 
Act, its legislative history and the decision in Niagara County Legislature and County of
Case No. IA2013-017 -3-
Niagara (County of Niagara)2 Following a review of the City’s exceptions, we find no 
basis for reversing City of Kingston.
In County of Niagara, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed our 
determination that the mandate of §209-a.1(e) of Act requiring an employer “to continue 
all the terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated,” along with 
the legislative history of that provision demonstrate that, without an employee 
organization’s consent, a legislative body under §209.3(e) of the Act is prohibited from 
ending an impasse by altering the terms and conditions of employment of an expired 
agreement. . -
In reaching our decision in City of Kingston we relied upon the same statutory 
language and legislative history. That history includes Governor Carey’s July 29, 1982 
memorandum approving the enactment of the bill to add §209-a.1(e) to the Act in which 
he stated an intent to seek an amendment to provide that an employer’s duty to 
continue all the terms of an expired agreement would extend only until either a new 
agreement was negotiated or the negotiating impasse was finally .resolved through the 
procedures set forth in §209 of the Act.3 Later that year, however, the Legislature 
rejected the bill introduced at Governor Carey’s request that would have terminated an
)
2 See Niagara County Legislature and County of Niagara, 16 PERB 1)3071 (1983) 
vacated sub nom, County of Niagara, New York v Newman, 122 Misc2d 749, 17 PERB 
117003 (S Ct Niagara County 1984), reversed 104 AD2d 1, 17 PERB 1)7021 (4th Dept 
1984).
3 L 1982, c 868, Memorandum of Governor Hugh L. Carey, July 29, 1982. McKinney’s 
1982 Session Laws of New York at pp. 2631-2632.
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employer’s obligation to continue the terms of an expired agreement upon a final 
resolution of a negotiating impasse through legislative imposition under §209.3(e) of the 
Act or interest arbitration under §209.4 of the Act. Instead, §209-a.1(e) of the Act was 
amended to terminate the employer’s statutory obligation only after we find that an the 
“employee organization which is a party to such agreement has, during such 
negotiations or prior to such negotiations,” engaged in conduct violative of §210 of the 
Act.4
The Court of Appeals in Town of Southampton v New York State Pub Empl Rel 
Bd,5 cited City of Kingston with favor in describing the scope of an employer’s obligation 
to maintain the status quo under §209-a.1 (e) to the Act. Finally, we note that the 
Legislature, when enacting the substantial 2013 amendments to the interest arbitration 
procedures set forth in §209 of the Act, did not amend the Act to overturn our decision 
in City of Kingston. Instead, it mirrored our decades-old holding by conditioning the use 
of the newly enacted alternative arbitration procedure with respect to a fiscally eligible 
municipality upon the consent of the employee organization through a joint request 
made with the employer.6
4 L 1982, c 921.
5 2 NY3d 513, 37 PERB 1j7001(2004).
6 L 2013, c 67, §3; §4-a(a) of the Act.
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We also deny the City’s request that we make a determination that Local 628 has
waived its right to negotiate over, or to subsequently seek to arbitrate, the terms and
conditions of employment for the at-issue two year periods following the expiration of
the parties’ agreement. The appropriate procedure for seeking a determination as to
whether a party has violated its duty to negotiate in good faith is through the filing of an
improper practice charge pursuant to §209-a of the Act. •
Finally, we affirm the Director’s conclusion that the City’s second petition should
not be processed because it is premature and speculative.
Based upon the foregoing, the City’s exceptions are denied and we affirm the
Director’s two decisions.
DATED: October 15, 2013
Brooklyn, New York
/Jerome Lefkc^itz, Chairperson
Sheila S. Cole, Member.
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of 
JOSE RODRIGUEZ,
Charging Party,
CASE NOS.
U-30747 & U-31421
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
DAVID BROPHY, for Charging Party
DAVID BRODSKY, ESQ., DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (KERRI A.
CROSSAN, of counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York (District) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), on improper practice charges filed by Jose Rodriguez 
(Rodriguez). In her decision, the ALJ found that the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it subjected Rodriguez to 
excessive classroom visits, issued a disciplinary letter against him, and rated his job 
performance as unsatisfactory in his mid-year and year-end evaluations, in retaliation 
for his protected activity under the Act.1 *
46 PERBU4509 (2013).1
Case Nos. U-30747 & U-31421 - 2-
EXCEPTIONS
Among its exceptions, the District asserts that the ALJ erred by denying its 
requests for an opportunity to review documents utilized by Rodriguez to refresh his 
recollection during his testimony concerning the frequency of classroom visits by school 
administrators after he had filed grievances. Rodriguez supports the ALJ’s evidentiary 
ruling and decision.
Following our review of the exceptions and response, we conclude that the ALJ 
erred by depriving the District of an opportunity to review the documents utilized by 
Rodriquez to refresh his recollection for use during cross-examination. As a result, we 
remand the case to the ALJ with the direction to reopen the record consistent with our 
decision.
DISCUSSION
During the hearing, Rodriquez testified that after he filed grievances, he was 
subjected to increased classroom visits by school administrators in September and 
October, 2010. The record reveals that Rodriguez repeatedly reviewed documents in 
his possession during his testimony to refresh his recollection.2 The documents were 
not introduced into evidence and their specific nature is not clear from the record. They 
are referenced as logs, personal notes, a calendar and a notebook.3
It is well-settled that an adversary has a general right to examine any writing 
used by a witness to refresh his or her recollection during a trial or hearing, and to utilize
2 Transcript, pp. 24-25, 27-28, 31, 65-69, 72.
3 Transcript, pp. 24-25, 27, 31, 65, 68, 70, 72, 80, 85-86.
Case Nos. U-30747 & U-31421 -3-
it during cross-examination of that witness.4 While the technical rules of evidence are 
not applicable during our hearings, they are instructive.5
In the present case, the ALJ denied requests by the District for access to the 
documents utilized by Rodriquez to refresh his recollection in order to prepare and to 
use the documents during cross-examination.6 The record reveals that the ALJ’s 
rulings were aimed at maintaining decorum and order during the hearing, which 
involved a pro se party testifying in narrative form. Nevertheless, we find that the ALJ 
erred in denying the District the opportunity to review and use the documents during 
cross-examination. In fact, the ALJ specifically referenced Rodriguez’s documents in 
crediting his testimony.7
Based upon the foregoing, we remand the charges to the ALJ with the direction 
to reopen the record to permit the District to review the documents Rodriguez used to 
refresh his recollection during his testimony, and provide the District with an opportunity 
to conduct additional cross-examination of Rodriguez limited to issues stemming from 
the content of those documents. Following the reopening of the record and the taking of 
further evidence, the ALJ shall issue a revised decision, which will be subject to new 
exceptions under §213 of our Rules of Procedure, (n light of our remand and the
4 People v Gezzo, 307 NY 385 (1954). Doxtator v Swarthout, 38 AD2d 782 (4th Dept 
1972); Greico v Cunningham, 128 AD2d 502 (2d Dept 1987).
5 Council 82, AFSCME (Bruns), 35 PERB 1J3023 (2002).
6 Transcript, pp. 61,65-6.
7 Supra, note 1,46 PERB 1J4509 at 4516.
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direction for a partial reopening of the record, we have not addressed the District’s other 
exceptions. Those other exceptions can be renewed by the District, if necessary, 
following the ALJ’s revised decision.
IT IS ORDERED that the charges are remanded to the ALJ with a direction to
reopen the record to permit the District to review the documents relied upon by
Rodriguez to refresh his recollection during his testimony, and to conduct additional
cross-examination of Rodriguez limited to the content of those documents.
DATED: October 15, 2013
Brooklyn, New York
/  Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Petitioner,
- and -
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CASE NO. CP-1342
STEVEN A. CRAIN AND DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, GENERAL COUNSELS
(BRIAN B. SELCHICK of counsel), for Petitioner
QUINN MARIE MORRIS, for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the Weedsport Central School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting a unit 
placement petition filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to place the position of Head Building Maintenance Person 
into the CSEA-represented unit.1
In its exceptions, the District contends the ALJ’s decision should be reversed
based upon a provision of the parties’ expired collectively negotiated agreement
(agreement)-, which excludes the position from the unit. According to the District, the
unit composition provision of the agreement constitutes a mandatory subject of
negotiations under the conversion theory of negotiability, which estops CSEA from filing
1 46 PERB fi4007 (2013). The Board acknowledges the assistance of law student intern 
Samantha Delia in the preparation of its decision.
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a unit placement petition. The District also contends that the filing of the petition 
constitutes a repudiation of the agreement by CSEA. Finally, the District asserts that a 
community of interest does not exist because of the potential for conflict inherent in the 
District’s ability to assign supervisory duties to employees holding the title of the Head
v
Building Maintenance Person.
Following our review of the arguments by the parties, and the evidence in the 
record, we affirm the ALJ’s decision. -
FACTS
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision, which were based upon a 
stipulation of facts between the parties.
CSEA represents a unit of District employees comprised of approximately 44 
non-instructional titles, including Auto Mechanic, Custodial Worker, Senior Custodial 
Worker and Groundskeeper/Building Maintenance Person. The. parties’ expired 
agreement explicitly excludes a number of titles from the bargaining unit, including Head 
Building Maintenance Person.
There are currently two employees in the title of Head Building Maintenance 
Person. Neither sought to be accreted to the CSEA-represented unit and one opposes 
such placement. Both perform duties related to the repair and maintenance of District 
equipment and buildings, and they do not perform any managerial or confidential duties 
as defined by the Act. ■ Neither hires, fires, or disciplines other District employees.
Their wages and benefits are similar to those negotiated by CSEA on behalf of unit
members.
DISCUSSION
A unit placement petition commences a representation proceeding limited to
determining whether an unrepresented position should be accreted to a pre-existing unit
based upon the statutory criteria in §207.1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment
Act (Act). We conduct a nonadversarial investigation and apply the statutory uniting
criteria in determining a unit placement petition.2 The most important criterion under
§207.1 of the Act for determining a unit placement petition is the community of interest
standard. Among the factors we consider in determining whether a community of
interest exists are similarities in terms and conditions of employment, shared duties and
responsibilities, qualifications, common work location, common supervision, and an
. \
actual or potential conflict of interests between the members of the proposed unit.3
We reject the District’s arguments premised upon the unit composition provision 
of the parties’ expired agreement. It is common for agreements to identify the titles 
included and excluded from the unit that is subject to the negotiated terms and 
conditions of employment. The content of a provision concerning unit composition is 
not controlling upon us in applying our statutory duties pursuant §207 of the Act.4 
Furthermore, under §201.2(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), the existence of such 
a provision does not estop an employee organization from filing a unit placement
2 See General Brown Cent Sch Dist, 28 PERB U3065 (1995).
3 See Sachem Cent Sch Dist, 42 PERB H3030 (2009).
4 County of Rockland, 28 PERB TJ3063 (1995); Regional Transit Serv, Inc., 35 PERB 
3022 (2002).
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petition, nor does it constitute a repudiation of the agreement.5 Finally, whether a 
change to the composition of the CSEA-unit is a mandatory subject of negotiations 
under the conversion theory of negotiability6 is not relevant to our determination 
concerning the question of representation presented by the unit placement petition.
We also reject the District’s argument that the unit placement petition should be 
denied because the position of Head Building Maintenance Person has supervisory 
duties. As we stated in New York State Division of State Police7:
The mere existence of supervisory responsibilities does 
not require a conclusion that there is present such a conflict 
of interest as to overcome or outweigh other facts or 
circumstances giving rise to a community of interest.
Rather, it is the degree and the nature of the supervision.
Supervisory functions such as the imposition of discipline, 
effective initiation of disciplinary procedures or the 
evaluation of a subordinate’s performance may indicate a 
conflict of interest.
The mere fact that a position has supervisory functions is not a per se basis for 
exclusion from a unit composed of a rank-and-file employees.8 There is nothing in the 
record demonstrating that the position Head Building Maintenance Person requires 
significant supervisory responsibilities, which would cause an actual or potential conflict
5 We would have reached the same conclusion if the District had filed an improper 
practice charge alleging that CSEA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by filing the 
representation petition.
6 City of Cohoes, 31 PERB K3020 (1998), confd sub nom, Uniform Firefighters of 
Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v Cuevas, 32 PERB K7026 (Sup Ct, Albany Co 
1999), aff’d, 276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB K7019 (3d Dep’t 2000), Iv denied, 96 NY2d 711, 
34 PERB 1(7018(2001).
7 1 PERB K399.32 at 3156 (1968).
8 New York Power Auth, 38 PERB 1(3003 (2005); Marcus Whitman Cent Sch Dist, 33 
PERBK3016 (1999).
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of interest.9
Finally, the District does not dispute that the Head Building Maintenance Person
and titles in the CSEA bargaining unit share common terms and conditions of
employment, work location and work responsibilities.
Based upon the foregoing, the District’s exceptions are denied, CSEA’s petition
for unit placement is granted and the title of Head Building Maintenance Person is
hereby accreted to the CSEA-represented unit.
DATED: October 15, 2013 
Brooklyn, New York
'i
9 Clinton Cmty Coll, 31 PERB H3070 (1997); East Ramapo Cent Sch Dist, 11 PERB 
113075 (1978).
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These consolidated cases come to the Board on separate exceptions filed by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), 
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 1359 (DC.37), the New York State 
Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) and the 
New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF), and cross-exceptions by 
the State of New York (Department of Civil Service) (State), to a decision of an
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Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing the respective charges of the employee 
organizations alleging that the State violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally imposed a fee schedule for civil service 
promotion/transition examinations. Without reaching the issue of whether the subject of 
the charges is a mandatory subject of negotiations, the ALJ dismissed the charges on 
the ground that the charging parties had failed to demonstrate a unilateral change in a 
past practice.1
EXCEPTIONS
CSEA excepts to the ALJ’s failure to determine that the subject of application 
fees for promotion/transition examinations is a mandatory subject under the Act and her 
finding that CSEA failed to prove that the State had unilaterally changed a past practice. 
For its exceptions, DC 37 contends that the ALJ misapplied the applicable standard for 
determining whether a binding past practice exists under the Act, and that the ALJ erred 
in concluding that the State’s prior internal deliberations with respect to imposing 
application fees for the at-issue examinations constituted a binding past practice. 
Similarly, PEF asserts in its exceptions that the ALJ misapplied our precedent and erred 
in concluding that the State’s unilateral action was consistent with a past practice of the 
State making periodic internal determinations as to whether to charge for the 
examinations. Finally, NYSCOPBA’s exceptions challenge the ALJ’s past practice 
analysis and determination, the ALJ’s finding that the State did not need to negotiate the 
unilateral change because it was exercising its discretion under Civ Serv Law §50, and
1 45 PERB 1|4620 (2012). On the mutual consent of the parties, multiple extensions 
were granted to the parties for the filing of exceptions by CSEA, DC 37, NYSCOPBA 
and PEF and the response and cross-exceptions by the State.
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her failure to determine whether the subject of the charges is a mandatory subject under 
the Act.
The State, in its response and cross-exceptions, supports the ALJ’s decision but 
asserts she erred in failing the reach the issue of whether the subject of the charges is 
mandatory and whether PEF’s charge is untimely.
Based upon our review of respective arguments of the parties, we reverse the 
decision of the ALJ to dismiss all four charges, and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with our decision.
FACTS
The applicable facts are fully set forth in the ALJ1 s decision, which are based 
upon the parties’ stipulation and the testimony of two State witnesses. They are 
repeated here only as necessary to address the exceptions and cross-exceptions.
The State Department of Civil Service (DCS) notified PEF in a letter dated 
January 30, 2009, that it would be establishing a fee structure for applications for 
promotion/transition examinations as part of its 2008-2009 Spending Plan and that the 
collection of the application fees would commence for examinations to be announced on 
March 13, 2009 and administered on May 30, 2009.
In General Information Bulletin Number 09-01 (Bulletin 09-01) dated March 16, 
2009, the DCS Director of Staffing Services announced to State department and agency 
personnel, human resources, and affirmative action offices that DCS would begin 
assessing fees for the processing of applications for promotion/transition examinations 
announced on or after March 13, 2009 and administered on.or after May 30, 2009. 
Bulletin 09-01 also announced increases in the application fees already paid for open
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competitive examinations.
Following issuance of Bulletin 09-01, the State began assessing application fees 
for the promotion/transition examinations, and all employees in the collective negotiating 
units represented by the charging parties who applied for such examinations have paid 
the fees. It is not disputed that the fees were implemented without collective 
negotiations with the charging parties.
For at least ten years prior to issuance of Bulletin 09-01, the State did not require 
employees in the collective negotiating units represented by the charging parties to pay 
application fees for promotion/transition examinations and such fees were not paid by 
employees in those units.
DCS implemented the application fees in 2009 for fiscal reasons after its plan, 
which included other proposed DCS budgetary options, was reviewed and approved by 
the State Division of Budget (DOB). DOB approved the implementation of the fee 
schedule due to the State’s economic condition at the time. When evaluating a 
proposal regarding application fees for civil service examinations, DOB considers a 
number of factors, including whether the proposal involves an existing or a new fee, the 
costs associated with implementation, the impact it will have and the likelihood that it 
will increase revenue within a specific time period.
In 2003, DCS had proposed to DOB that application fees for promotion/transition 
examinations for State employees be imposed and that fees for open competitive 
examinations be increased. At that time, DOB approved increasing the fees for open 
competitive examinations, but rejected the imposition of a fee for promotion/transition 
examinations. In 2004 and 2005, DOB again disapproved DCS proposals to establish
- 6 -
promotion/transition examination fees for State employees to achieve necessary 
budgetary cuts.
DISCUSSION
In Chenango Forks Central School District (Chenango Forks),2 we restated the 
applicable test for determining whether there is an enforceable past practice concerning 
a mandatory subject under the Act. Under that test, there must be a prima facie 
showing of a practice that was unequivocal and continued uninterrupted for a period of 
time sufficient under the facts and circumstances to create a reasonable expectation s 
among the affected unit employees that the practice would continue. Our past practice 
analysis is fact-specific and, in general, a long term practice alone will constitute 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.3 The prima facie showing by a 
charging party, however, is subject to an employer's affirmative defense that it lacked 
actual or constructive knowledge of the practice. ' ■ . ^
In the present case, the record firmly demonstrates the State’s actual knowledge 
of the practice. Therefore, the application of our past practice analysis under Chenango 
Forks centers on whether the facts and circumstances demonstrate that the State’s ten 
year practice of not charging fees to take the promotion/transition examinations created
2 40 PERB P012 (2007), remanded, 42 PERB ^4527 (2009), affd, 43 PERB P017 
(2010), confd sub nom, Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v New. York State Pub Empl Ref 
Bd, 95 AD3d 1479, 45 PERB 1J7006 (3d Dept 2012) affd 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB P008 
(2013).
3 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB P005 (2008), confd and remitted on other 
grounds sub nom.Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
61 AD3d 1231,42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009) on remittiur, 42 PERB P017 (2009); 
City of Oswego, 41 PERB P 0 1 1 (2008).
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a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees that the practice would 
continue.
Following our review of the record and without determining whether the subject is 
mandatory, we find that the unequivocal nature of the practice and its uninterrupted 
continuation for at least ten years demonstrates that employees in the represented units 
had a reasonable expectation that the practice would continue. 1
Contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the present case is not analogous to State of 
New York (Governor’s Office of Employee Relations and Department of Health)4 Under 
the unique facts in that case, we found that the departmental practice of sponsoring an 
annual picnic and permitting employees to attend without charging leave accruals was 
conditioned on the employer’s unfettered discretion, which had been codified in the 
DCS Time and Attendance Manual. The facts demonstrated that in prior years the 
department had applied its discretion when considering annual requests for an 
employee picnic by PEF and CSEA representatives. As a result, we concluded that the 
State had not unilaterally changed the practice when it applied its discretion by denying 
a request for a 1990 employee picnic. In light of the contours of that particular practice, 
the represented employees in that case lacked a reasonable expectation that the 
annual picnics would continue.
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand the cases 
for a determination as to whether the subject of the charges is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations, and to decide the State’s timeliness defense concerning PEF’s charge.
4 25 PERB lf3005 (1992), confd, Public Employees Fedn, AFL-CIO v New York State 
Pub Empl Rel Bd, 195 AD2d 930, 26 PERB 117008 (3d Dept 1993).
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Nothing in our decision precludes the ALJ, at her discretion, from reopening the record
for purposes of receiving offers of proof and/or additional evidence from the parties
including evidence to resolve an ambiguity in the record: whether the at-issue practice
was limited to represented employees or whether the practice and the unilateral change
were also applicable to nonunit employees.
DATED: October 15, 2013
Brooklyn, New York
x  Sheila S. Cole, Board Member
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1181,
Petitioner,
-and-
MTA BUS COMPANY,
CASE NO. TIA2013-023
Respondent.
PITTA & GIBLIN LLP (BRUCE J. COOPER, of counsel) for Petitioner 
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (NEIL H. ABRAMSON, of counsel) for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to. us by reason of a report and recommendation of the
/•
Director of Conciliation (Director) regarding a petition for interest arbitration filed by the 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1181 (ATU Local 1181) under §209.5 of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) and §205.15 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
with respect to an impasse in contract negotiations between ATU Local 1181 and the 
MTA Bus Company (MTA).
In his report and recommendation, the Director concludes that a voluntary 
resolution of the contract negotiations between ATU Local 1181 and the MTA cannot be 
effected and recommends that the impasse be referred to a public interest arbitration 
panel.
The MTA has not filed an objection to the Director’s report and recommendation
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pursuant to §205.15(b) of the Rules.
Following our review of the Director’s report and recommendation, we hereby 
certify that a voluntary resolution of the contract negotiations between ATU Local 1181 
and the MTA cannot be effected and we, therefore, refer the impasse involving these 
parties to a public interest arbitration panel.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 15, 2013
Brooklyn, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
